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Introduction
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) published a report on the `low cost airline service revolution'. The report not only identified that a growing fraction of passengers are benefiting from low cost carriers through lower fares but also predicted that this "… watershed development in domestic aviation … is having a profound effect on efficiency, competition, consumers and industry structure."
1 In particular, although the report expects a certain co-existence of network carriers and low cost carriers, it suggests that substantial additional changes on the side of network carriers are necessary to successfully face the challenge of low cost competition.
Almost fifteen years after the drafting of the DOT report, the low cost airline service revolution has not only continued -reflected in an increase of the domestic passenger market share from about 13 percent in 1997 to about 28 percent in 2009 -but also led to a substantial rise in the competitive interaction between network carriers and low cost carriers. For example, while in 1997 the route overlap between network carriers and low cost carriers in the largest 1000 airport-pair routes lied at about 13 percent, the value increased to 31 percent in 2009. At the same time, the average cost (excluding fuel) for the group of network carriers increased from 8.8 cents per available seat mile to 11.0 cents. In contrast, the group of low cost carriers managed to further reduce their average cost level from 7.7 cents in 1997 to 6.6 cents in 2009.
Against this background of a substantial and further increasing relevance of low cost carriers, the article aims at developing a comprehensive perspective of the evolution of the domestic U.S. airline industry. Although substantial prior research on the U.S. airline industry in the post-deregulation era is available 2 , the article provides several new perspectives. First, the data-set spans from 1995 to 2009 and therefore allows an investigation of both recent external shocks such as the 9/11 attacks or the economic recession, and internal shocks such In addition to a large number of studies that focus on specific trends in the deregulated airline industry such as entry (see, e.g., Boguslaski et al., 2004) , concentration (see, e.g., Belobaba and Van Acker, 1995; Lee, 2003) , fares (see, e.g., Borenstein, 1989; Brueckner et al., 2011) or the increasing role of low cost carriers (see, e.g., Hofer et al., 2008; Ito and Lee, 2003; Dresner et al., 1996) , several studies aim at painting a full picture of the evolution of the U.S. airline industry such as Borenstein (1992) , Borenstein and Rose (2007) , Morrison and Winston (1995) or the Transportation Research Board (1999).
economic assessment of the key characteristics of both major groups of carriers. Third, the quality of the data-set allows a revisit of important market structure, market conduct and market performance parameters and creates possibilities for innovative and informative new analyses such as entry and exit patterns or market concentration and fare developments differentiated by (route-level) market structure or mileage blocks.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The subsequent second section provides a first overview of market size and major players. A particular focus of this section lies on the introduction and characterization of the two major groups of carriers -network carriers (NWCs) and low cost carriers (LCCs) -with the help of various characteristics such as market share; average revenue; average cost; number of non-stop routes; average route length; average load factor; total fleet park; and number of employees. Subsequently, the third section focuses on route entry and exit patterns, followed by a detailed investigation of recent trends in concentration in the fourth section. Section five concentrates on an assessment of fare level developments between 1995 and 2009 by differentiating between different (routelevel) market structures and mileage blocks. The sixth section investigates developments in several important service components, followed by assessments of the cost level and the cost structure in Section 7 and the resulting profit levels of both network carriers and low cost carriers in Section 8. The ninth section concludes the article by summarizing the key insights and discussing several important policy implications.
Size and major players
A suitable starting point for a characterization of the recent evolution of the U.S. airline industry is the presentation of basic data with respect to market size and major players. 
S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data; authors' calculations
The first chart in Figure 1 plots the development of passengers and revenue passenger miles for the entire domestic U.S. airline industry. Both measures apparently follow the same trends and reveal that especially the 9/11 attacks had a significant but nevertheless only temporary impact on overall demand growth. Although the revenue passenger miles measure decreased In addition to an analysis of the time-series for the entire domestic U.S. airline industry, a sample split by type of carrier allows a more detailed interpretation. The second chart in Figure 1 offers such a split by differentiating between major network carriers (NWCs) and major low cost carriers (LCCs). The chart reveals that the demand of NWCs is much more volatile than the demand of LCCs. While both of the very significant external shocks in sample period -the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the economic recession in 2008/09 -appear to have a significant impact on the number of passengers travelling with NWCs, LCC demand only shows reduced (but largely still positive) growth rates.
In search for an explanation for this observation, it is necessary to characterize both groups of carriers further. Network carriers are typically large airlines with a long industry history.
These carriers operate large hub-and-spoke networks which aim at connecting a large number of (national and international) cities through a small number of large hub airports.
3 Network 3
The group of network carriers is supported by a larger group of regional airlines. Most of those smaller airlines operate in small feeder traffic markets and often assist one particular network carrier in the operation of its hub-and-spoke network. Although most of these regional carriers are legally independent, their economic existence is often tied to a large network carrier. For example, in most instances, regional carriers do not issue their own tickets but refer to the network carrier for all flight bookings. In the empirical analysis 0 100,000
200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 370,000 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 NWC Domestic RPM (millions) The term 'low cost carrier' already gives away more than a hint what the key differentiation criterion from the group of network carriers might be. However, although a significantly lower cost structure is indeed a very important and unifying feature of all members of this group, a more profound characterization of the group must remark first that their business is typically focusing on point-to-point traffic rather than channeling passengers through hubs. Further distinctive characteristics of low cost carriers are basically connected to their efforts to reduce costs and increase (ancillary) revenue, e.g., through the provision of a single passenger class, a reduced variety of small and more fuel efficient aircraft, operating services to secondary airports, no in-flight entertainment, unreserved seating, direct selling of (one-way and return) tickets through the internet or the selling of priority seats as well as food and beverages on board. 4 The following airlines are classified as (the major) LCCs in the domestic U.S. airline industry: AirTran Airways; Allegiant Air; Frontier Airlines; JetBlue Airways; Southwest Airlines; Spirit Airlines; Sun Country Airlines; and Virgin America.
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Coming back to possible explanations for the observed differences in demand volatility for both groups of carriers shown in the second chart in Figure 1 above, it is important to mention that especially a reduction in (national and international 6 ) business traveler's demand typically puts the network carriers under pressure in turbulent economic times. In addition to an overall reduction in business flights, the effect might be aggravated by possibilities of firms to reduce travel expenses by switching from network carriers to low cost carriers. An alternative explanation for the observed differences could be seen in different positions of the NWC and of entry patterns below, regional airlines are excluded from the analysis. For all other analyses, regional carriers are merged to the respective major carrier for which they operate on a specific route. See, e.g., Mason and Morrison (2008) for a detailed characterization of low cost carrier business models.
Although these characteristics provide a good fit for most LCCs, the delineation is not perfectly selective. For example, although AirTran Airways is usually classified as LCC, the airline offers business class services. Furthermore, although few would disagree that JetBlue Airways is a LCC, its business strategy focuses on increasing service quality through the provision of, e.g., in-flight entertainment or the use of primary airports. Despite these activities by low cost carriers to differentiate from each other through a deviation from the 'pure' low cost carrier concept, the unifying characteristic of all members of this group is a significantly lower cost level (measured in cents per available seat mile) compared to the group of network carriers.
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Although the focus of this article is on U.S. domestic rather than international traffic, the latter certainly has implications for the former. For example, a passenger travelling from Frankfurt via New York (JFK) to San Francisco (SFO) is counted as U.S. domestic passenger on the route from JFK to SFO. As a consequence, fluctuations or even breaks in international demand can have substantial knock-on effects on the level of domestic demand of NWCs (while it leaves the demand situation of LCCs largely unaffected).
LCC business models in their respective 'life cycles'. While the NWC business model might have a clear focus on keeping the existing business rather than additional growth, the LCC business model might not have reached maturity yet and has therefore better possibilities to expand its business even during the experienced economic downturns of the U.S. economy.
Before the focus of the analysis is turned to selected market structure, market conduct and market performance characteristics, it adds value to investigate the identified two major groups in the domestic U.S. airline industry -network carriers and low cost carriers -a little further. In particular, an interpretation of the developments of the following characteristics is offered in the next paragraphs: Market share (in percent of 'revenue passenger miles' (RPM)); Figure 2 presents the corresponding timeseries for the different characteristics aggregated for the two major groups of carriers. 1,100 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 The number of non-stop routes provided by a carrier can on the one hand be interpreted as a measure of network size. On the other hand, the measure can also be related to service quality as the larger the number of non-stop routes offered by a particular airline the higher the probability that a particular passenger is able to take a (direct) flight to a certain destination with the respective airline. Chart (4) in Figure 2 Average route length is an important parameter for various reasons. First, flight length is a key driver of revenues and costs. Second, in the early days of LCCs, the respective firms basically focused on short-and medium-haul routes. However, recently, LCCs not only increased their medium-haul presence further but also started to operate long-haul flights on a larger scale thereby putting additional pressure on NWCs. Against this background, Chart (5) reports the average route lengths of the respective carriers. 9 The chart reveals that in 1995, the group of NWCs had a significantly higher average route length (733 miles) than the group of 7 A comparison of the average revenue figures with the average cost figures reveals that the revenue measure is typically below the cost measure suggesting significant overall losses. However, given the highly aggregated data used for the comparison, this finding -which was also reported in previous studies such as Hazel et al. (2011) -should not be overrated.
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Please note that the discontinuity in the LCC trend in the year 2000 must be attributed to the market entry of JetBlue Airways and Allegiant Air. Given the 11 route entries of JetBlue and the 6 route entries of Allegiant in 2000, the LCC average value inevitably has to drop significantly.
LCCs (612 miles). However, while the average route length of the NWCs only showed a slight increase over the entire sample period reaching an average of 781 miles in 2009, the group of low cost carriers substantially increased their average route length to 900 miles in 2009 suggesting significant market entry activity in medium-and long-haul markets.
The load factor represents the proportion of airline output that is actually consumed. It can generally be derived by dividing Revenue Passenger Miles (RPMs) by Available Seat Miles (ASMs) for the entire airline system or by dividing the number of passengers by the number of seats for a particular flight. Chart (6) shows the average load factor for both NWCs and
LCCs and reveals an increasing trend for both types of carriers. While the average load factor for NWCs increased from 66.0 percent in 1995 to 83.9 percent in 2009, the group of LCCs shows an increase from 54.9 percent to 81.3 percent in the same time frame. Interestingly, the average load factor of the NWCs is always larger than the respective load factor of the LCC group. However, in recent years, the differences between both groups were rather small in the range of a few percentage points. In general, higher load factors of NWCs might be explained by the network concept which allows the respective airlines to fill the respective seats more easily than with the point-to-point concept largely followed by LCCs.
The total fleet park is a possible measure of the existing production facilities of the respective groups of carriers. However, as U.S. carriers do not differentiate their fleet statistics with respect to domestic or international operations, the recent trends shown in Chart (7) should not be overrated. This is also true because LCCs tend to reduce the different types of (smaller) aircraft in their fleet park to a minimum (in order to keep operating and maintaining costs low). Despite these limitations, the chart reveals that LCCs constantly increased their fleet from 257 aircrafts in 1995 to 911 aircrafts in 2009. In the same time frame, the group of NWC reduced their fleet slightly from 2,788 in 1995 to 2,422 in 2009.
However, the group of NWCs has still roughly three times the aircraft capacity than the group of LCCs.
The number of employees is the last characteristic analyzed in Table 1 Destination Survey DB1B Market database. In calculating average fares, zero fares, abnormally high fares and fares which required the passenger to change the airplane more than twice were also excluded from the data-set.
Entry and exit
Market entry and exit is a crucial determinant of competition intensity. While market entry automatically leads to a reduction in market concentration, it typically also increases competitive pressures thereby triggering a downward trend in the average market price (and/or an increase in average product quality). Market exit is normally associated with inverted effects on concentration, fares and service.
Against this background, this section provides evidence on the patterns of entry and exit in non-stop U.S. airline markets between 1996 and 2009. 11 In addition to the study of entry and exit events by NWCs and LCCs in non-stop airport-pair markets, the section also analyses splits of entry data with respect to the type of market and the length of haul. It is important to remark that the analysis in this section focuses on single entry and exit decisions of NWCs and LCCs on a route level and therefore does not specifically discuss the drivers and consequences of multiple entry and exit events through new firm creation, merger or bankruptcy (see, e.g., Borenstein and Rose (2007) for an overview of recent evidence).
10 Although there are good reasons for applying both market delineation concepts -airport-pairs and city-pairs -we follow the more conservative approach of airport-pairs. Every effect found at airport-pair level is expected to be even more pronounced at city-pair level. For a detailed discussion of airport-pairs vs. citypairs, see Brueckner et al. (2010) . 11 An entry is determined by the quarter when we first observe an airline providing non-stop scheduled services.
Since our data begins in 1995, all airlines enter by definition in 1995. Thus, we have to concentrate our entry analysis on the time frame from 1996 to 2009.
Entry and exit in non-stop airport-pair markets
A natural starting point of the study of entry patterns is a general analysis of all entry events on the non-stop airport-pair level. In this respect, T-100 Domestic Segment Data analysis reveals that the overall number of non-stop airport pairs operated by commercial airlines increased from 1,962 routes in 1995 to 2,658 routes in 2009. These numbers alone suggest a significant entry activity in the sample period. This finding is basically confirmed by Figure 3 which plots the number of route entries by NWCs and LCCs. Turning from recent entry activities to recent exit activities, prior research for various industries has shown that both activities are often closely related phenomena (see, e.g., Geroski, 1995) . For example, entry into one market can demand exit in another market as, e.g., a particular aircraft can be operated more efficiently on the new route. Furthermore, any reorganization of the flight network typically triggers several entry and exit attempts. For example, airline mergers often lead to market exits either through the elimination of 
Entry in new non-stop airport-pair markets
Providing airlines with the freedom to decide on market entry and exit was one of the key accomplishments of the liberalization of the U.S. airline industry. Since then, airlines made frequent use of the gained possibilities to optimize their route networks and to provide efficient air services to their customers. Complementary to bringing competition to existing routes, an important part of an individual airlines' market success is the identification and realization of additional profit opportunities through the entry into routes which have not been served directly before, i.e. entry into new markets. Although the entry decision of the airline is typically profit driven, such 'innovative entry' clearly has positive impacts on consumers who are able to travel on the newly established airport-pair. In order to investigate the role of innovative entry, the first chart in Figure 4 shows the percentages of entries by network carriers and low cost carriers in new markets between 1996 and 2009.
12 A prominent example would be the merger between American Airlines and Trans World Airlines in April 2001. Due to the proximity of American's own hub at Chicago O'Hare to the Trans World hub in St. Louis, the latter was basically decommissioned after the merger and replaced by regional jet service. As a consequence, airline operations in St. Louis were reduced from over 800 operations a day to just over 200. 13 An exit is defined to have taken place in the quarter when we last observed an airline serving a non-stop airport-pair between 1995 and 2009. 14 Please note that the number of exits reported here refer to exits of particular airlines from particular routes. In most of the cases, the exited route remains to be operated by at least one other airline. As a consequence, it is not feasible to compare the exit rates derived here with the development in the number of non-stop airport pairs reported above. As it can be expected that the more dense routes are rather mature markets, it is likely that the 'first mover' routes are relatively small and need time to develop a sufficient level of demand.
Entry in short-, medium and long-haul non-stop airport-pair markets
In its 1997 report on the 'Low Cost Airline Service Revolution', the U.S. DOT expected a coexistence of network carriers and low cost carriers with the latter providing local passengers the benefit of additional service and lower prices on short-and medium-haul markets, while the former, by continuing to link the spoke city with its network, "… provide local passengers who prefer to use the network carrier's service and connecting passengers who wish to travel beyond the hub city in other city-pair markets additional, competitive alternatives" (U.S. DOT, 1997, p. 17) .
In order to investigate the actual relevance of such a coexistence of NWCs and LCCs, the second chart in Figure 4 above provides an overview of the market entries of LCCs in all markets split into short-haul markets (< 750 miles), medium-haul markets (750-1500 miles)
and long-haul markets (> 1500 miles). As shown in the chart, there is significant variation in the entry behavior across short-, medium-and long-haul markets. In sum, between 1996 and 2009, low cost carriers entered 1,137 airport-pair markets. 383 entry events (about 34 percent) in the short-haul segment.
Concentration
The entry and exit activity studied in the previous section is directly reflected in various measures of market concentration. Ceteris paribus, if a further carrier is entering an airportpair in which two airlines are already operating, market concentration typically decreases. In general, market concentration is viewed as one key determinant of competition intensity as, ceteris paribus, competition in a market with five airlines can be expected to be tougher than competition in a market with only two airlines. As a consequence, fares in the latter market are typically higher than in the former less concentrated market.
Given this potentially important role of market concentration, an initial overview of the number of non-stop airport-pairs together with the respective number of firms can provide first insights. Table 2 presents such an overview. As shown in Table 2 , the overall number of airport-pairs with scheduled airline services increased from 1962 routes in 1995 to 2658 routes in 2009, i.e. the airline network has become denser in the last fifteen years. However, Table 2 also reveals that about 76 percent of all non-stop airport-pair routes in 2009 were operated by a single airline, an increase of about 2.4 percentage points compared to 1995. Although such a monopoly situation might look worrying at first glance, a closer look in the data reveals that, on the one hand, the large majority of these monopoly routes are actually very small (partly with only a few passengers per quarter) and, hence, market entry by a second airline would simply be unprofitable. On the other hand, focusing on the more dense domestic routes shows that, in 2009, 81.6 percent of all domestic passengers travelled on the largest 1000 routes. As shown in Figure 5 , the share of monopoly routes is reduced slightly on those denser routes. If the analysis is narrowed down from the TOP 1000 routes to the TOP 100 routes (representing about 23.4 percent of all domestic passengers in 2009), the third chart in Figure   5 shows that the share of monopoly routes is reduced even further to 12 percent while 35 percent of the markets are duopolies and the remaining 53 percent of the markets are operated by more than two airlines. As for the TOP 1000 routes, LCCs increased their presence in all three subgroups substantially. With respect to the route overlap, the bottom right chart in Figure 5 shows substantially higher values than for the TOP 1000 aggregate. While the route overlap lied at about 26 percent in 1995, it increased to 64 percent in 2009, i.e. in 64 of the largest 100 domestic routes, NWCs and LCCs compete directly against each other. The share 15 Although the finding of an increased overlap between NWCs and LCCs as such is robust, it has to be reminded that the focus of the analysis in this article is on airport-pairs rather than city-pairs. Therefore, a flight between two primary airports (such as Chicago O'Hare and Houston Bush) is considered a separate market from a flight between two secondary airports of the respective cities (such as Chicago Midway and Houston Hobby). Given the LCCs focus on secondary airports, it can be expected that the degree of overlap has increased even further if city-pairs would be the focus of the analysis.
of routes in which only LCCs are operating, however, lies at about 2 percent only, basically reflecting the facts that, first, many routes out of secondary airports do not belong to the largest 100 routes and, second, many LCCs increasingly consider primary airports as a destination or even a hub (such as, e.g., JetBlue Airways in New York JFK).
Although the analysis so far provided useful insights in the development of market concentration since 1995, the assessment would be incomplete without a discussion of suitable concentration measures. After balancing the advantages and disadvantages of concentration rates and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHI), Figure 6 provides an initial overview of the development of the average route HHI (based on number of passengers) for various aggregations from 1995 to 2009. 
S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data; authors' calculations
As shown in Figure 6 , the average HHI values differ substantially for the different route aggregates. While the average route HHI for the TOP 1000 markets lies in the range from 0.70 to 0.85, the respective values for the TOP 10 market are found in a range from 0.35 to 0.55. Generally, the larger the route aggregate, the larger is the average HHI basically due to the increasing dominance of highly concentrated routes. Furthermore, Figure 6 reveals further that the volatility of the respective time-series increase substantially with shrinking aggregate size. This observation can basically be explained by both the smaller selection of routes in the aggregate and the increased intensity of competition on these routes. Despite those differences between the different route aggregates, a unifying characteristic shown in Figure 6 are the underlying trends. All average HHI time-series show a significant increase in the aftermath of 9/11 (likely triggered by the substantial exit activity) and a trend of reduced average route concentration in the following years until the economic recession in 2008 again causes an increase in average route concentration for most route aggregates. In addition to a general analysis of HHIs on an aggregate route level, a differentiation by length of haul can add value especially due to the identified increase in the presence of LCCs in medium-and long-haul routes. Ceteris paribus, such a development would suggest a decrease in the degree of market concentration. Figure 7 provides the HHI values for a split by length of haul again for the TOP 1000 and TOP 100 routes.
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Turning from the TOP 1000 routes to the TOP 100 routes, it becomes immediately apparent that HHI variation is substantially increased. Even more important, the conclusions for the three mileage blocks are somewhat different. For the short-haul routes, the chart reveals that the general trend is largely comparable to the TOP 1000 category, the long-haul routes start off with a significantly lower concentration than medium-haul markets in 1995. In LCCs lead to a quick gain in market share causing an overall increase in the HHI compared to the pre-entry situation. For example, a case study of the low cost carrier JetBlue Airways revealed that the airline managed to reach market shares of more than 60 percent already one year after entry took place. 16 In other words, low cost carrier entry might lead to a higher market concentration than before entry as low cost carriers can be extremely successful in growing fast taking away market share from the incumbent airlines (or even causing their exit from the respective route). The corresponding increase in the HHI, however, is of no particular concern from a welfare perspective given the incremental consumer benefits typically associated with low cost carrier entry. 16 For example, in the quarter of the entry of JetBlue Airways in the medium-haul route from New York (JFK) to Fort Lauderdale (FLL) in the year 2000, the airline was already able to realize a market share of about 30 percent. One year after entry, the share increased to about 66 percent. The route-specific HHI lied at about 0.43 in the quarter before entry, dropped to 0.34 in the quarter of entry and then again increased reaching 0.51 one year after the entry of JetBlue Airways.
Fares
A key accomplishment of the first two decades after deregulation was a significant downward trend in the average fare level (see, e.g., Morrison and Winston, 1995) . Turning from the TOP 1000 routes to the TOP 100 routes, it becomes apparent that not only the average yield level decreases but also that the yield variation increases significantly.
Although this observation has partly to do with the smaller number of routes on which the reported average values are based, it nevertheless also suggests that competitive pressure in the TOP 100 markets is higher than in the TOP 1000 markets. This finding is also reflected in the NWC fare premium which shows significantly lower values for the TOP 100 routes. For monopoly routes, the measure is partly found to be below one suggesting that the LCCs are able to generate higher average revenues on these routes than the NWCs.
Complementary to an analysis of the average yield developments for various market structures, the analysis of market concentration in the preceding section suggests casting an eye on the market yield and fare premium developments for short-, medium-and long-haul markets. Figure 9 shows the respective results, again for the TOP 1000 and TOP 100 routes.
(1) TOP 1000 routes (2) TOP 100 routes In terms of the NWC fare premium, the two charts in Figure 9 show a rather continuous downward trend for short-haul markets in both the TOP 1000 and the TOP 100 category.
However, while the fare premium for medium-haul routes largely remained constant since 2002 for both route aggregates, the corresponding value for long-haul routes shows a downward trend starting in 2007 in the TOP 100 category. Again, the average fare premiums are systematically larger in the TOP 1000 markets than in the TOP 100 markets.
Although the focus of the article is on a high-level identification of recent trends in the evolution of the domestic U.S. airline industry, the significant number of previous studies on the existence and the size of a so-called hub premium, i.e. higher average fares charged by (often slot-or gate-constrained) hub airports, demands a brief revisit of this important issue (see, e.g., Borenstein, 1989) . In order to study the recent developments in this respect, Figure   10 plots the average fares (in 1995 $) for selected hubs from 1995 to 2009. Although the AQR concept includes major quality parameters such as on-time performance or customer complaints, the methodology is necessarily incomplete. If the AQR would capture all relevant service parameters in the relevant proportion, the immediate question would have to be raised why customers are still using low quality-high price NWC services. In addition to further service advantages of NWCs such as business class services, 20 The category 'customer complaints' comprises the following 12 sub-categories: Flight Problems; Oversales; Reservations, Ticketing, and Boarding; Fares; Refunds; Baggage; Customer Service; Disability; Advertising; Discrimination; Animals; Other. their networks between 1995 and 2009. As already discussed in Section 2 above, a large fraction of this growth, however, must be attributed to exclusive agreements with regional carriers rather than internal growth of the parent company. In the group of LCCs, the substantial increase in the average number of non-stop routes is driven by Southwest Airlines which has expanded its network from 176 non-stop routes in 1995 to 442 non-stop routes in 2009 and is now the third largest U.S. carrier in terms of number of non-stop connections.
Costs
The lack of possibilities and incentives to operate efficiently in the era of regulation was reflected in an elevated cost level of all major airlines. In the twenty years following deregulation, the network carriers manage to reorganize their operations in general and their route networks in particular. As a consequence, the average cost level decreased significantly (see, e.g., Borenstein, 1992) . With the appearance and success of the low cost carrier concept, the importance of the cost side of operations reached a new level. By strictly optimizing their operations, low cost carriers manage to operate at costs per available seat mile which are significantly below the average of the network carriers. Figure 13 shows the average cost levels (full and excluding fuel) for NWCs and LCCs for the entire sample period from 1995 to 2009. In addition to aggregate cost data, Figure 13 also With respect to a breakdown of overall costs by type, Figure 13 
Profits
After addressing revenues and costs in the preceding sections, the consequential final step is to cast an eye on the profitability of the U.S. airline industry. Generally, post-deregulation developments showed both periods of operating profits (1984-1989 and 1994-2000) and periods of operating losses (1980 -1983 -1993 see Borenstein and Rose, 2007) . The more recent developments plotted in Figure 14 In a recent article, Borenstein (2011) investigates several explanations for the apparent profitability issues of the group of network carriers. Differentiating between exogenous cost drivers, exogenous demand shocks and the expansion of low cost carriers, he basically concludes that although high taxes and fuel cost shocks surely contributed to the weak profitability performance of the group of network carriers, the two major drivers seem to be the severe demand downturn after the 9/11 attacks and the large cost differential between network carriers and low cost carriers which has persisted even as their price differentials have declined substantially. These key findings are consistent with the results presented in this article.
Conclusion
The deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 aimed at encouraging competition thereby realizing lower fares and improved services. While the entrepreneurial spirit of the first few years after deregulation -manifested in sweeping reorganization efforts and substantial new market entries -indeed triggered the desired increase in competitive interaction, the subsequent consolidation phase with increasing concentration and alarming airline financial performance tempted the first airline experts to argue that " [t] he time has come to roll back deregulation" (Dempsey, 1990, 407) . Given this key aim of the article, the main results of the analysis are summarized in Table   3 . The structure of the table follows the section structure of the article and differentiates between size and major players, entry and exit, concentration, fares, service, costs, and profits. 
Criteria

Main results
Size and major players
 Overall demand -measured in revenue passenger miles -increased by about 37 percent between 1995 and 2009. The majority of the demand increase must be attributed to LCCs.  LCCs increased their domestic market share from about 11% in 1995 to about 28% in 2009.  The growth of LCCs is not only reflected in increases of the number of non-stop routes operated, the size of the fleet park or the number of employees but also in a substantial increase in the average route length of LCC flights.  Although NWCs and LCCs follow rather distinct business models, LCCs have started to include service components into their products which are normally attributed to network carriers (e.g., business class service, in-flight entertainment, primary airport operations). of the LCC entries took place in medium-or long-haul markets.  Exit activity is much more pronounced for NWCs with in sum about 2,250 route exits, compared to only 391 exits on the side of the LCCs. A substantial fraction of the NWC exits were triggered by external and internal shocks such as recession or merger activity. Concentration  In 2009, about 76% of all airport-pairs were operated on a monopoly basis; however, the majority of passengers traveled on routes with more than one operating airline.  Although the number of monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly routes only show moderate changes throughout the sample period, the presence of low cost carriers increased substantially in the largest 1000 routes (from 10% to 32% in monopoly routes, from 23% to 58% in duopoly routes; and from 25% to 76% in oligopoly routes).  The NWC-LCC route overlap in the largest 1000 markets increased from about 10% in 1995 to 31% in 2009 (and from 26% in 1995 to 64% in 2009 for the TOP 100 routes).  The route-based Herfindahl-Hirshman Indexes for the largest 1000 short-, medium-and long-haul routes revealed a general downward trend in concentration for the sample period; however, the 9/11 attacks and the recent recession triggered significant increases in market concentration, most recently especially in long-haul markets. Fares  The annual domestic U.S. average fare decreased from $292 in 1995 to $235 in 2009 (real).  Monopoly routes consistently realize higher yields than all other routes; while LCC yields remained largely unchanged between 1995 and 2009 in the TOP 1000 routes, NWC yields show decreases of 27% for monopolies, 25% for duopolies and 33% for oligopolies.  Short-haul routes consistently realize a higher yield than medium-or long-haul routes;
Entry and exit
short-haul NWC yields decreased by 25% while LCC yields increased by 29% from 1995 to 2009; medium-haul NWC yields decreased by 33% while LCC yields stayed almost constant; long-haul yields decreased for both NWCs (-37%) and LCCs (-23%).  The hub premium still exists but its size is shrinking, at least for the hubs in New York, Chicago and Dallas. Average fares at selected secondary airports increased substantially. Service  Following the Airline Quality Rating scores, LCCs on average perform systematically better than NWCs in a set of service categories including on-time performance, denied boardings, mishandled baggage and customer complaints throughout the sample period.  Focusing on the number of non-stop routes as a measure for network size reveals that NWCs have a substantial service advantage in this category in addition to further service advantages such as business class services, assigned seating, free food etc. Costs  The costs per available seat mile (excluding fuel cost) show that the cost advantage of LCCs was relatively moderate in 1995 with little more than one cent per mile.  In the sample period, LCCs managed to reduce average cost from 7.5 cents in 1995 to 6. Given the overview of the main results presented in Table 3 , it can be concluded that low cost carriers must be considered as the driving force of competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry. Although network carriers still have significant advantages -first and foremost with respect to the sizes of their networks and their higher quality products (in several dimensions)
-especially the market entries of innovative new low cost carriers such as JetBlue Airways and most recently Virgin America are expected to increase competitive interaction further.
This type of low cost carrier not only introduced large scale entry in medium-and especially long-haul markets -types of routes which have not been the focus of significant low cost carrier operations before -but also reduces the service disadvantages of low cost carriers in several dimensions such as in-flight amenities, the use of primary airports or close cooperation with international carriers. As a consequence, it is not unlikely that especially business travelers will more and more consider this new type of low cost carrier as a close substitute and will therefore increase the pressure on network carriers to rationalize their operations even further. in the domestic U.S. airline industry. Nevertheless, the antitrust authority should be aware of the substantial value of low cost carriers for competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry.
As a consequence, it is crucial to constantly monitor the industry and to foreclose serious attempts of network carriers to reduce or even eliminate competitive pressure. Such an active antitrust policy is especially necessary for both proposed acquisitions of 'maverick' low cost carriers by network carriers as well as attempts of network carriers to apply instruments out of the tool box of anticompetitive behavior.
If these challenges are taken seriously, there is no doubt that the following 2002 statement by the late Alfred Kahn will continue to be proven correct: "Most disinterested observers agree that airline deregulation has been a success. The overwhelming majority of travelers have enjoyed the benefits that its proponents expected. Deregulation also has given rise to a number of problems, including congestion and a limited reemergence of monopoly power and, with it, the exploitation of a minority of customers. It would be a mistake, however, to regard
